# **Politics of Economic Growth**

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Class Time: Tuesday & Thursday, 2:50 p.m. - 4:15 p.m.
Office hours: Tuesday & Thursday, 12:00 p.m. - 2:00 p.m., room LNG 273

## **Course Description**

The question of why some countries are poor while others are rich is among the most fundamental questions in economics and political science. Up to this day, severe academic debates continue on whether one or another factor is the most important in determining the level of prosperity. Until relatively recently, three factors were considered to be pivotal in driving (or slowing down) economic growth: geographic position of a country, its culture, and bad (or good) policy decisions. However, recent studies done by Acemoglu and Robinson questioned validity of all these theories and proposed a simple alternative explanation: political and economic institutions are the principal force that drives countries to prosperity or poverty. Countries are not doomed by their geographic location or long cultural legacies – their fortunes and misfortunes are due to institutional environments constructed by political elites.

In this course, we'll delve deeper into political determinants of economic growth and examine how politics can drive countries to poverty or prosperity. We'll also look into alternative approaches mentioned in the previous paragraph in order to gain an appreciation of academic debates between proponents of these theories. Finally, we'll look into some specific factors that are often considered important in determining the level of prosperity: innovations, healthcare, war, inequality, corruption, and foreign aid. To summarize, the course is broadly divided into two parts that are separated by the Midterm Exam: the first part is all about the "big picture" while the second part focuses more on specific details.

The vast majority of required and recommended readings will be posted on-line. You can simply click on the link in the syllabus, and it will re-direct you to the PDF which you can either read in the browser or download to your computer. Main course assignments include writing a final research paper, midterm exam, and two critical review papers. Since this is the seminar-type class, you are required to actively participate in every discussion and share your opinions on readings with me and your peers.

Open to seniors only (Political Science, PPL, ENVI, Dual Diploma majors). Others permitted by petition.

## Harpur College and General Education Requirements

This course fulfills the "W" and "N" requirements.

## W – Harpur College Writing Requirement

- Writing (W) courses provide considerable experience in and feedback on writing as a tool of college-level teaching and learning.
- Written assignments in W courses constitute 30 to 100 percent of the basis for the grade in the course and typically consist of a minimum of 10 pages of writing.

### N - Social Sciences

Students in N courses will demonstrate:

- Knowledge of major concepts, models, and issues (and their interrelationships) of at least one of the social sciences: anthropology, economics, geography, history, political science, or sociology.
- An understanding of the methods used by social scientists to explore social phenomena, including, when appropriate to the discipline, observation, hypothesis development, measurement and data collection, experimentation, evaluation of evidence, and analysis by mathematics or other interpretive frameworks.

## **Important Dates**

Any assignments submitted after the specified deadlines will be penalized. All written assignments must be submitted to turnitin links posted on myCourses as well as in printed form to me. All written assignments must be typed using either Microsoft Word, or LaTeX, or any other document-editing system of your choosing.

Midterm Exam	. October, 9
Final Paper Proposal	. November, 1
First Critical Review Paper	. October, 18
Second Critical Review Paper	. November, 15
Final Paper Presentations	December, 4 & 6
Final Paper	.December, 14

## Grading

- All assignments will be graded using 100 point scale. At the end of the course, I will convert your scores into percentages of the final grade in accordance with the weight of each assignment.
- Each assignment contributes the following % to the final grade: Final Paper 25 %, First Critical Review Paper 10 %, Second Critical Review Paper 10 %, Final Paper Proposal 10 %, Midterm Exam 15 %, Final Paper Presentation 10 %, Participation 10 %, Attendance 10 %.
- Grading rules are as follows: 93 100 = A; 90 92 = A-; 87 89 = B+; 83 86 = B; 80 - 82 = B-; 77 - 79 = C+; 73 - 76 = C; 70 - 72 = C-; 60 - 69 = D; 0 - 59 = F.

## **Description of Assignments**

• Two Critical Review Papers: 750-1000 words each

In this assignment, the goal is for you to get a taste of the review process that is inherent to any academic work. Imagine that you were asked by an editor of a research journal to review someone's work and give recommendation whether to publish the work, send it back to author for revisions, or reject it. For this assignment, you will need to write a review for an academic paper from the list of required or recommended readings (you can pick readings from any week), analyze strong and weak parts of this paper and give your recommendation on whether to publish the paper, send it for revision, or reject it. You can find some sample reviews on the Internet if you want to get a taste how such review paper should look like, but the general guideline is this: focus on evaluating the quality of the research and make sure the points you make are logical and correspond to the contents of the paper. The most important thing to remember is that sometimes even when you personally disagree with author's arguments, if his/her research is of high quality, you should put that above any personal opinions you might hold. In a real review process, you would not have known the name of a person (or persons) whose work you are reviewing (this measure is introduced to avoid bias). You will, of course, have the luxury of knowing the author of the paper you chose, but try to imagine that you don't know who wrote the paper and be as objective as possible.

#### • Final Paper: 3000-3500 words

The final paper for this class should be your own research project. Although every individual paper often has its own structure, I would recommend following several general guidelines. First part of your paper should be an introduction where you clearly state your research question (e.g. "does democracy increase the level of economic prosperity?"), discuss why your research question is interesting (i.e. why your peers should care about your research and its results), and outline the structure of the remainder of your paper (i.e. what is discussed in each section of the paper). You can also state your general argument and findings. The second part of your paper should address the relevant literature that is related to your topic of interest. The literature should include books published by reputable organizations (e.g. Cambridge University Press, Princeton University Press, Stanford University Press etc.) and/or papers from well-known and respected academic journals (e.g. Americal Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Science, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Econometrica, Journal of Politics, World Development, American Economic Review etc.). The third section of your paper should contain the theoretical argument. For example, if you argue that democracy is good for the level of country's prosperity, you should explain why do you think this is the case. You should also state clear and testable empirical implications from your argument. Oftentimes, these hypotheses will directly follow from your research question, but in some cases you may have additional implications from your theory that might be interesting, so you should also clearly state them as hypotheses. Fourth section should provide some tests for your empirical expectations. If you familiar with statistics and statistical software such as R, STATA, or SPSS, I strongly encourage you to conduct data analysis for the empirical part of your paper. This data analysis can take different forms, from something as simple as summary statistics to more complicated methods of regression analysis with graphical interpretations. I can always help you with collecting relevant data from Internet sources and writing scripts if your data can be scraped from the Web. Alternatively, you can do case studies and refer to historic examples/evidence that corroborate or contradict your argument. Both data analysis and case studies are equally valid options for empirical part of your paper. The final section of your paper should briefly re-state the main findings and discuss potential further extensions of the paper or/and points that you could not, for some reasons, address. You can also include any additional final remarks you deem appropriate.

• Final Paper Proposal: 400-600 words

Your final paper proposal should include the following components: a) outline of your theory and testable hypothesis (or hypotheses), b) empirical strategy, and c) brief review of the relevant literature. For empirical strategy, make sure to state how do you plan to test your hypothesis. You can choose to do case studies by searching for historical accounts that corroborate or contradict your hypothesis, or you can do quantitative data analysis. For the literature review, you are required to cover at least 10 sources (academic papers and/or books) that are relevant for your research question. You don't need to give me extended review of each item in your list – just outline in 1-2 sentences the main idea/findings in the item and its relevance for your work. You can also group description of items together if they argue/find similar things. Every item in your list must be cited in accordance with APSA citation manual.

You are required to meet with me **at least once before November**, **1** in order to discuss your final paper and also **at least once** after I give you back your proposal with my comments and suggestions.

• <u>Midterm Exam</u>

Midterm exam will consist of three short essay questions and one extra credit short essay question.

• Final Paper Presentation

Whether you work in academia, think tank, private company or government agency, it is important to present your work to peers in a comprehensive way. The structure of the presentation is entirely up to you, but it should look professional and clearly elaborate main points of your paper. I recommend doing presentations in PowerPoint or Beamer, but you can use any presentation software you like. Time limit for your presentation is 10-12 minutes. You should also be prepared to answer 3-4 questions after you end the presentation.

### • Attendance & Participation

This is a seminar class, so you are required to actively participate in discussions. I will take attendance in the beginning of every class, and it will contribute 10 % to your

final grade. Participation grades will be based both on overall activity and quality of your comments.

## **Rules of Conduct**

- You should arrive at the class in a timely manner. Plan your schedule accordingly and don't be late.
- Cell phone use is not allowed under any circumstances. Cell phones must be turned off and stored so that they are not visible.
- You can use your laptop during discussions for the purposes of taking notes or checking your notes on readings. If I notice that you use your laptop for any other purposes, I'll ask you to put it away.
- I expect you to be professional, polite, and respectful during discussions.

## Academic Honesty

Students should review university guidelines regarding academic honesty and ensure that the work they complete for this course is theirs and theirs alone. Cases of academic dishonesty will be taken very seriously and may result in a failing grade for the course in addition to any penalty imposed by the university. If you have any doubt about what constitutes plagiarism or a violation of academic honesty, please consult the university code and/or contact the instructor.

Information on Plagiarism. Tutorials on Academic Honesty.

## Grade Appeals

If you wish to appeal a grade you have received, you must submit a one-page computeredited (e.g. in Word) statement to me at least 24 hours after receiving the grade. The statement must clearly and thoroughly explain the reasons why your work deserved a higher grade. Your assignment will then be re-graded, taking your statement into consideration. **The revised grade may be higher, lower, or the same as the initial grade.** 

## **Disability-Related Equal Access Accommodations**

Students wishing to request academic accommodations to ensure their equitable access and participation in this course should notify the instructor by the second week of the class. Authorizations from Services for Students with Disabilities (SSD) are generally required. Please contact SSD at (607)777-2686 to schedule an appointment with the Director or Learning Disabilities Specialist. Their website includes information regarding their Disability Documentation Guidelines. The office is located in UU-119.

## **Course Outline**

SyllabusAugust, 23	
Origins of the Modern Political OrdersAugust, 28 & 30	
Economic Development & Political Regimes I September, 4 & 6	)
Economic Development & Political Regimes II September, 13	
Cultural & Geographic Factors of Economic Development	20
The Role of Institutions in Economic Development I $\ldots \ldots \ldots$ September, 25 &	27
The Role of Institutions in Economic Development II $\hdots $ October, 2 & 4	
Midterm Exam October, 9	
Politics of Innovations October, 16 & 18	\$
War & Economic DevelopmentOctober, 23 & 25	)
Corruption & Economic Development October, 30 & No	ovember, 1
Inequality & Economic Development November, 6 & 8	
Healthcare & Economic Development November, 13 $\&$	15
For eign Aid & Economic Development $\ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots$ November, 27 &	29
Final Presentations December, 4 & 6	

## Readings

In this class, you will be given a list of required and recommended readings for each week. Titles are self-explanatory: required readings are mandatory while recommended readings are optional. If you can read all required and recommended materials, this is great! Thorough knowledge of the assigned material will help you to productively participate in class discussions. But at least on some occasions you may find yourself in a position where you just don't have time to read everything in detail. For such situations, I can give the following advice: try to be strategic and skim through some of the readings. I can also give practical advice: when you don't have time to read every paper in detail, skip literature review sections!

### August, 28 & 30 – Week 2

#### **Required Readings:**

- Tilly, Charles. 1985. "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime." In *Bringing the State Back In*, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschmeyer, and Theda Skocpol. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Weingast, Barry R. 1997. "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law." American Political Science Review 91(2): 245–263.
- Buchanan, James M. 1975. *The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan*. The University of Chicago. Chapters 2 & 3.
- Clark, William, Matt Golder, and Sona Golder. 2017. "An Exit, Voice and Loyalty Model of Politics." British Journal of Political Science 47(4): 719–748.

#### Recommended Readings:

- Clark, William, Matt Golder, and Sona Golder. 2013. *Principles of Comparative Politics, 2 ed.* SAGE Publications. Chapters 3 & 4.
- Buchanan, James M. 1975. *The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan*. The University of Chicago. Chapters 4, 5 & 6.
- Gambetta, Diego. 1993. *The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Introduction, Chapters 1, 2 & 3.
- Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2001. "A Theory of Political Transitions." American Economic Review 91(4): 938–963.

### September, 4 & 6 – Week 3

#### Required Readings:

- Olson, Mancur. 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development." American Political Science Review 87(3): 567–576.
- Leblang, David. 1996. "Property Rights, Democracy, and Economic Growth." *Political Research Quarterly* 49(1): 5–26.
- Przeworski, Adam, and Fernando Limongi. 1993. "Political Regimes and Economic Growth." Journal of Economic Perspectives 7(3): 51–69.
- Helliwell, John. 1994. "Empirical Linkages Between Democracy and Economic Growth." British Journal of Political Science 24(2): 225 – 248.

#### Recommended Readings:

- Olson, Mancur. 1991. "Autocracy, Democracy, and Prosperity." In *Strategy and Choice*, ed. R. J. Zeckhauser. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Leblang, David. 1997. "Political Democracy and Economic Growth: Pooled Cross-Section and Time-Series Evidence." British Journal of Political Science 27(3): 453– 472.
- Meltzer, Allan H, and Scott F. Richard. 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government." The Journal of Political Economy 89(5): 914–927.

### September, 13 – Week 4

#### Required Readings:

- Przeworski, Adam, and Michael Wallerstein. 1988. "Structural Dependence of the State on Capital." American Political Science Review 7(3): 51–69.
- Clark, William, Matt Golder, and Sona Golder. 2013. Principles of Comparative Politics, 2 ed. SAGE Publications. Page 384 – 402.
- Barro, Robert J. "Rule of Law, Democracy, and Economic Performance." In *Index of Economic Freedom*. Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Alastair Smith. 2011. The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics. PublicAffairs. Chapters 1 – 5.

#### Recommended Readings:

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D Morrow, Randolph Siverson, and Alastair Smith. 2001. "Political Competition and Economic Growth." *Journal of Democracy* 12 (1): 58 - 72.

## September, 18 & 20 - Week 5

#### Required Readings:

- Sachs, Jeffrey D., and Andrew M. Warner. 2001. "The Curse of Natural Resources." *European Economic Review* 45 (4-6): 827 – 838.
- Gallup, John Luke, Jeffrey D. Sachs, and Andrew D. Mellinger. "Geography and Economic Development." International Regional Science Review 22(2): 179 232.
- Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2012. *Why Nations Fail.* Crown Publishes. Chapter 2.
- Casson, Mark. 1993. "Cultural Determinants of Economic Performance." Journal of Comparative Economics 17 (2): 418 442.
- Easterly, William, and Ross Levine. 2003. "Tropics, Germs, and Crops: How Endowments Influence Economic Development." Journal of Monetary Economics 50 (1): 3–39.

#### Recommended Readings:

- Sachs, Jeffrey D., and Andrew M. Warner. 1999. "The Big Push, Natural Resource Booms and Growth." Journal of Development Economics 59 (1): 43 – 76.
- Wildavsky, Aaron. 1985. "A Cultural Theory of Expenditure Growth and (Un)balanced Budgets." *Journal of Public Economics* 28 (3): 349–357.
- Diamond, Jared. 1999. Guns, Germs, and Steel. The Fates of Human Societies. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
- Sachs, Jeffrey, and Pia Malaney. 2002. "The Economic and Social Burden of Malaria." Nature 415: 680 – 685.

## September, 25 & 27 – Week 6

#### **Required Readings:**

- North, Douglas C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1 & 3.
- Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2012. *Why Nations Fail.* Crown Publishes. Introduction, Chapter 1, 3, 4 & 5.

#### Recommended Readings:

- North, Douglass, and Barry R. Weingast. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England." *The Journal of Economic History* 49 (4): 803–832.
- North, Douglas C. 1990. *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 2.

### October, 2 & 4 - Week 7

#### **Required Readings:**

 Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2012. Why Nations Fail. Crown Publishes. Chapter 6 – 15.

#### Recommended Readings:

- Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2002. "Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117 (4): 1231 1294.
- Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation." The American Economic Review 91 (5): 1369 – 1401.
- Dell, Melissa. 2010. "The Persistent Effects of Peru's Mining *Mita.*" *Econometrica* 78(6): 1863–1903.

### October, 9 – Week 8

No readings – Midterm Exam

## October, 16 & 18 – Week 9

#### **Required Readings:**

- Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2006. "Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective." American Political Science Review 100 (1): 115–131.
- Gerschenkron, Alexander. 1962. *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Chapters 1, 2, 3.
- Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2000. "Political Losers as a Barrier to Economic Development." The American Economic Review 90 (2): 126 – 130.
- Bridgman, Benjamin R., Igor D. Livshits, and James C. MacGee. 2007. "Vested Interests and Technology Adoption." *Journal of Monetary Economics* 54 (3): 649 – 666.
- Singh, Espen Moe. 2012. "Structural Change, Vested Interests, and Scandinavian Energy Policy-Making: Why Wind Power Struggles in Norway and not in Denmark." *The Open Renewable Energy Journal* 5: 19 – 31.

#### Recommended Readings:

- Balalaeva, Dina. 2015. "Political Competition, Agenda Power, and Incentives to Innovate: An Empirical Examination of Vested-Interest Theory." *Review of Policy Research* 32 (4): 413–442.
- Parente, Stephen L., and Edward C. Prescott. 2000. *Barriers to Riches*. Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

### October, 23 & 25 – Week 10

#### Required Readings:

- Collier, Paul. 1999. "On the Economic Consequences of Civil War." Oxford Economic Papers 51 (1): 168–183.
- Kang, Seonjou, and James Meernik. 2005. "Civil War Destruction and the Prospects for Economic Growth." *The Journal of Politics* 67 (1): 88–109.
- Chowdhury, Abdur R. 1991. "A Causal Analysis of Defense Spending and Economic Growth." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35 (1): 80–97.

• Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. "Aid, Policy, and Growth in Post-Conflict Societies." *European Economic Review* 48 (5): 1125–1145.

#### Recommended Readings:

- Fearon, James D. 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War." International Organization 49 (3): 379–414.
- Organski, A.F.K., and Jacek Kugler. 1980. *The War Ledger*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Chapter 3.
- Olson, Mancur. 1982. *The Rise and Decline of Nations*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

### October, 30 & November, 1 – Week 11

#### **Required Readings:**

- Mo, Pak Hung. 2001. "Corruption and Economic Growth." Journal of Comparative Economics 29 (1): 66–79.
- Mauro, Paolo. 1995. "Corruption and Growth." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 (3): 681–712.
- Leff, Nathaniel. 1964. "Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption." American Behavioral Scientist 8 (3): 8–14.
- Meon, Pierre-Guillaume, and Khalid Sekkat. 2005. "Does Corruption Grease or Sand the Wheels of Growth?" *Public Choice* 122 (1-2): 69–97.
- Aidt, Toke S. 2009. "Corruption, Institutions, and Economic Development." Oxford Review of Economic Policy 25 (2): 271–291.

#### Recommended Readings:

- Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert Vishny. 1993. "Corruption." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 108 (3): 599–617.
- Olken, Benjamin A., and Rohini Pande. 2012. "Corruption in Developing Countries." Annual Review of Economics 4 (1): 479 – 509.

• Beekman, Gonne, Erwin Bulte, and Eleonora Nillesen. 2014. "Corruption, Investments and Contributions to Public Goods: Experimental Evidence from Rural Liberia." *Journal of Public Economics* 115: 37–47.

### November, 6 & 8 – Week 12

#### Required Readings:

- Alesina, Alberto, and Dani Rodrik. 1994. "Distributive Politics and Economic Growth." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 109 (2): 465–490.
- Bannerjee, Abhijit, and Esther Duflo. 2003. "Inequality and Growth: What Can the Data Say?" Journal of Economic Growth 8 (3): 267–299.
- Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. 1994. "Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?" The American Economic Review 84 (3): 600–621.
- Halter, Daniel, Manuel Oechslin, and Josef Zweimüller. 2014. "Inequality and Growth: the Neglected Time Dimension." Journal of Economic Growth 19 (1): 81–104.

#### Recommended Readings:

- Shin, Inyong. 2012. "Income Inequality and Economic Growth." *Economic Modelling* 29 (5): 2049–2057.
- Barro, Robert J. 2000. "Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries." Journal of Economic Growth 5 (1): 5–32.
- Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman. 2018. "Growth, Trade, and Inequality." *Econometrica* 86 (1): 37–83.
- Acemoglu, Daron. 2009. *Introduction to Modern Economic Growth*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapter 22.

### November, 13 & 15 – Week 13

#### Required Readings:

• Bloom, David E., David Canning, and Jaypee Sevilla. 2004. "The Effect of Health on Economic Growth: A Production Function Approach." World Development 32 (1): 1–13.

- Acemoglu, Daron, and Simon Johnson. 2007. "Disease and Development: The Effect of Life Expectancy on Economic Growth." *Journal of Political Economy* 115 (6): 925–985.
- Reeves, Aaron, Martin McKee, Sanjay Basu, and David Stuckler. 2014. "The Political Economy of Austerity and Healthcare: Cross-national Analysis of Expenditure Changes in 27 European Nations 19952011." *Health Policy* 115 (1): 1–8.
- Well, David N. 2007. "Accounting for the Effects of Health on Economic Growth." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 122 (3): 1265–1306.
- Lorentzen, Peter, John McMillan, and Romain Wacziarg. 2008. "Death and Development." Journal of Economic Growth 13 (2): 81–124.

#### Recommended Readings:

- Rosenberg, Dina, Vladimir Kozlov, and Alexander Libman. 2018. "Political Regimes, Income and Health: Evidence from Sub-national Comparative Method." *Social Science Research* 72: 20–37.
- Cervellati, Matteo, and Uwe Sunde. 2011. "Life Expectancy and Economic Growth: the Role of the Demographic Transition." Journal of Economic Growth 16 (2): 99–133.
- Bloom, David E., David Canning, and Günther Fink. 2014. "Disease and Development Revisited." Journal of Political Economy 122 (6): 1355 1366.

### November, 27 & 29 – Week 14

#### Required Readings:

- Tavares, Jose. 2003. "Does Foreign Aid Corrupt?" Economic Letters 79 (1): 99–106.
- Burnside, Craig, and David Dollar. 2000. "Aid, Policies, and Growth." The American Economic Review 90 (4): 847 – 868.
- Alesina, Alberto, and David Dollar. 2000. "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?" Journal of Economic Growth 5 (1): 33 63.
- Collier, Paul, and David Dollar. 2002. "Aid Allocation and Poverty Reduction." European Economic Review 46 (8): 1475 – 1500.

• Banerjee, Abhijit, and Esther Duflo. 2009. "The Experimental Approach to Development Economics." Annual Review of Economics 1: 151 – 178.

#### Recommended Readings:

- Sachs, Jeffrey D. 2005. *The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities of Our Time*. The Penguin Press.
- Alesina, Alberto, and Beatrice Weder. 2002. "Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?" American Economic Review 92 (4): 1126 – 1137.
- Rajan, Raghuram G., and Arvind Subramanian. 2008. "Aid and Growth: What Does the Cross-Country Evidence Really Show?" Review of Economics and Statistics 90 (4): 643 665.
- Weintraub, Michael. 2016. "Do All Good Things Go Together? Development Assistance and Insurgent Violence in Civil War." Journal of Politics 78 (4): 989 1002.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Alastair Smith. 2011. *The Dictator's Handbook: Why* Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics. PublicAffairs. Chapter 7.

## December, 4 & 6 - Week 15

No readings – Final Presentations